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Abstract
The software and information services (SIS) sector is at the heart of the New Economy
and has been rapidly growing through the whole world during the last decades. This is
also the case in Argentina where in the middle of a deep recession, the turnover of the
sector augmented by 40 per cent and employment by 43 per cent between 1998 and
2000.
The objective of this paper is to analyse the evolution, present situation and prospects
for the Argentine SIS sector, relying on a detailed survey recently made to 100 firms
operating in this developing country. Most of these firms are locally-owned and young
SMEs supplying the domestic market but there are also a few large firms accounting for
the lion’s share of that market. Exports are negligible in terms of the sector’s turnover.
Argentina seems to have some advantages to exploit in order to make significant
inroads in this sector: it has a relative abundance of high-skilled labour, a sizeable
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domestic market and a cultural influence in Spanish-speaking South America. SIS
activities began in the 1970s and the sector has developed so far without any
government support.
None the less, SIS firms in Argentina have been basically tied to one particular segment
of the domestic market—i.e., software for accountancy, management, etc.—where they
enjoy advantages derived from the idiosyncratic feature of the domestic regulations and
their knowledge about the business culture and the needs of their local clients. Firms
experience problems in competing via costs, while, apart from some isolated exceptions,
have never competed through innovation. Besides, they lack marketing capabilities as
well as access to investment and working capital. Programming and analysis skills are
available but they are relatively expensive in comparison to the situation in other
developing and latecomer countries. Furthermore, management skills are imperfect. In
turn, networking mechanisms are weak, both among SIS firms as well as with their
customers, R&D institutions, etc.
There is then a need both for action aimed at improving the SIS firms capabilities and
endowments, as well as for intelligent public policies to foster this sector and
dramatically increase its export capacity. The experiences of other developing and
latecomer countries should help in finding ways to overcome the problems faced by this
promising sector and significantly enhance its prospects.1
1 Introduction
The software and information services (SIS) sector has been rapidly growing
everywhere in the last decades. This dynamism will persist in the foreseeable future, as
long as this sector is at the heart of what has been called the New Economy.
Developed countries are both the main producers and consumers of SIS. In turn, there
are several large firms based in these countries that have consolidated dominant
positions at world level in different segments of the SIS sector. Nonetheless, there
seems to be room for firms from developing countries to enter and grow in this sector,
as proven by the experience of India, Brazil, Singapore, Taiwan, Korea, Costa Rica, etc.
The highly publicized cases of Ireland and Israel also show the possibilities of
latecomer countries to play a significant role in this sector.
In this regard, it is important to take into account that the SIS sector is far from being a
mature sector. Its technologies, markets and products are constantly evolving.
Furthermore, since the sector is still at a sort of ‘handcrafted’ stage, there is room to
advance in terms of ‘process technologies’. In this scenario, some firms from latecomer
or developing countries have managed to compete in export markets through truly
innovative products aimed at certain niches. In fact, there are several modes of entry for
firms from developing countries in the SIS sector, each requiring different endowments
and capabilities and each having different consequences in terms of the sectoral
dynamics (Heeks 1999).
In this scenario, the objective of this paper is to analyse the strengths, weaknesses and
prospects of the Argentine SIS sector relying mainly on the results of a detailed survey
made in 2000-1 on nearly 100 SIS firms.
SIS activities began in Argentina in the 1970s and the sector has developed so far
without any government support. In the middle of a recent deep recession, the turnover
of the sector increased by 40 per cent and employment by 43 per cent between 1998 and
2000. Most of the producers are locally-owned, young SMEs supplying the domestic
market but there are also a few large firms accounting for the lion’s share of that
market.
Despite its recent good performance, perhaps no one in the world has ever heard of
Argentine SIS firms making significant inroads in export markets. Argentina is still not
seen as a country that may become a significant producer of software and information
services.
Nonetheless, the country has some advantages to exploit in order to make significant
contributions in this sector. First, it has a relative abundance of high-skilled labour,
which is a key factor for competition in this sector. Second, it preserves at least some of
its old cultural influence on the rest of the Spanish-speaking South America, a factor
that could help Argentine firms penetrate those markets, taking advantage not only of
the geographical but also of the cultural proximity with them. Third, Argentina’s GDP in
2000 was around US$ 280 billion with a GDP per capita above US$ 7,000. Hence, the
domestic market, while being far from those of developed countries, offers a relatively
adequate development base for local firms. Last but not least, there seems to be an
expanding consensus on the need to modify Argentina’s trade specialization pattern. In
addition to encouraging resources-based activities, the country should foster skilled labour2
intensive activities. Unskilled labour based productive branches have almost disappeared
due to trade liberalization in the 1990s, while scale intensive activities have to compete with
their counterparts in Brazil, a country which is better endowed to compete through scale
economies.
Section 2 deals briefly with the experience of the SIS sector in some developing and
latecomer countries, and suggests some conceptual hypotheses to be discussed in the
Argentine case. Section 3 presents the main results of the mentioned survey. Section 4
discusses the impact of some key institutional and macroeconomic variables on the
evolution of the SIS sector. The main conclusions and policy suggestions are presented
in section 5.
2 SIS in developing and latecomer countries: a brief review
Which are the main limitations that firms in developing countries usually face when
trying to enter the SIS sector? According to Heeks (1999), they are:
−   weaknesses in the physical and communications infrastructure of their home
countries;
−   the fact that their domestic home markets are usually small (and often supplied by
illegal copies), which hinders the chances of recovering the costs involved in the
development of innovative products;
−   access to finance is usually limited and interest rates are often high, while
mechanisms such as venture capital are almost unknown;
−   local firms rarely have strong marketing capabilities; and
−   the diffusion of stringent quality standards is usually very limited.
Furthermore, when trying to enter foreign markets, firms from developing countries
must face additional obstacles such as:
−   the lack of trust about their technical capabilities and uncertainty about compliance
with quality standards, schedules, etc.;
−   the lack of detailed knowledge about the requirements of foreign customers; and
−   linguistic and cultural barriers, lack of knowledge of the business culture and norms
in foreign markets, etc.
In this scenario, developing country firms wishing to engage in this sector must adopt
strategies that match their endogenous capabilities, as well as with the endowments and
assets of their home country. At the same time, they must try to circumvent the
limitations posed both by their own history and lack of certain skills. The state may help
this process through different measures, both by trying to strengthen local technological
and innovative capabilities and infrastructure, as well as by contributing to solve some
market failures which constrain the development of the SIS sector.
In fact, there have been some successful experiences in developing and latecomer
countries entering into this sector. Many firms from Asian and Latin American3
countries, as well as from some countries of the European periphery, have not only
managed to acquire dominant positions in their home countries but have also entered the
developed country markets. Besides, some large American and European SIS firms
have made outward direct investments in developing as well as in latecomer countries,
mostly aimed at adapting their products and services to the cultural, linguistic,
institutional, etc. features of the different regional markets.
Different entry strategies can be observed. The first dividing line separates those
countries whose firms have mainly followed ‘inward-oriented’ strategies (i.e. Brazil,
South Korea, etc.) from those where ‘export-oriented’ strategies have been dominant
(i.e. India, Ireland, Israel).1 The second dividing line depends on whether local firms or
affiliates of foreign corporations have played a dominant role in the development of the
SIS sector.
Among ‘export-oriented’ strategies, one can find different modes of competition. While
Indian firms have mainly competed on the basis of low wages and the provision of
information services (including the so-called ‘body-shopping’ activities), Israel’s firms
have developed significant innovative capabilities in some niche areas such as anti-
virus, software security and protection, encryption technologies, etc. In turn, Ireland has
been chosen as the base for serving European markets by several large American—as
well as by some European—firms, although some indigenous Irish firms have also
made significant inroads in this sector.
Although SIS firms in developing and latecomer countries have been largely oriented
towards the export of services, there are cases where the export of software products has
been more relevant. In turn, the activity of exporting software products can assume
different variants. While in Ireland most exports involve adaptations and ‘localizations’
of American software products to the needs of the different European markets, in Israel
domestic firms export locally developed products. In India there has been an upsurge of
the activity of ‘offshore’ software development.
With regard to the role played by different types of firms, in Ireland foreign
corporations clearly dominate but this is not the case in Israel and India. However,
domestic firms in these countries have different arrangements with their counterparts in
industrialized countries that include subcontracting arrangements, joint ventures,
strategic alliances, etc.
Different strategies require different conditions and/or assets in order to be implemented
successfully. For instance, in the case of Ireland, the fact of having an English-speaking
population played a major role in the decision of the American software companies to
install affiliates in that country, but the public policies aimed at attracting foreign direct
investment through tax incentives were also a major driving force for those decisions. In
fact, neither of these factors alone would have led to the observed massive arrival of
foreign investments in the SIS sector.
While the relatively abundant endowment of skilled personnel with low wages has been
a clear precondition for the success of the Indian strategy, strategies such as those
                                                
1 See, among other studies, Weber et al. (2000) for Brazil, Zhang (2000) for the cases of the Asian
developing countries, Teubal et al. (2000) for Israel, Tallon and Kraemer (1999) and Coe (1999) for
Ireland and Arora et al. (1999), D’Costa (2000) and Heeks (1996) for India.4
followed by Israel’s firms require high-skilled personnel, domestic research capabilities
and sophisticated local customers (in the case of Israel, notably the army).
In turn, the state played a significant role in fostering SIS activities through specific
policies in most of the countries that have made significant inroads in this sector (such
as India, Ireland, Brazil, etc.) as well as in those that have entered more recently
(Uruguay, Costa Rica, etc.).
In spite of the variety of strategies followed by countries with a vigorous SIS sector,
Heeks (1999) identifies some of the necessary key factors for developing-country firms
to be successful. On the one hand, they include microeconomic or enterprise elements
such as:
−   identification of demand-growth markets and synergies;
−   ability to compete via costs or service innovation;
−   good marketing;
−   access to investment and working capital;
−   access to programming, analysis and management skills
−   access to information technology; and
−   networking mechanisms, both intra-firm as well as with other software firms,
potential or actual clients, etc.
On the other hand, public policies also play a key role in areas such as:
−   finance (access to working and venture capital and tax incentives);
−   education and training;
−   research and development;
−   intellectual property rights protection;
−   state procurement; and
−   infrastructure (telecommunications, etc.).
Last but not least, a sort of ‘national vision’ is also needed (i.e. determining which is the
desired specialization and competitive pattern for the SIS sector in each country).
In the next section, we analyse to what extent these conditions are met in the Argentina’s
case.
3 The SIS sector in Argentina
There was already an incipient activity in the SIS sector in Argentina in the 1970s
during the import substitution industrialization process.5
The first study on this sector was undertaken in the mid-1980s (SECYT 1987). At that
time, nearly 70 per cent of the domestic market was supplied by imported software, and
there were about 300 local firms engaged in the provision of SIS. In conjunction with
the access to skilled human, the need to take into account the idiosyncratic features of
the fiscal and accountancy local regulations was the main advantage of domestic firms.
resources. In contrast, their main limitations were the relatively small size of the domestic
market, the lack of capabilities in R&D and marketing, and the obstacles for having
access to finance (see also Correa 1990).
Some years later the situation had not changed very much. In the early 1990s—after the
so-called ‘lost decade’, when the economy was stagnant and high inflation was the rule—
there were around 300 SIS firms, which employed nearly 4500 people. Two-thirds of the
local market was supplied by imports. In turn, exports were negligible (Correa 1996).
In view of the significant structural reforms (such as trade liberalization and privatization)
that have taken place in Argentina in the early 1990s, the sharp increase in imports of
goods and services, the boom in FDI inflows and the rapid economic growth between
1991 and 1998, it was expected that a different, and expectedly more vibrant, SIS sector
would have emerged in the country. The analysis made in the next sections will shed light
on to what extent this kind of transformation has effectively taken place.
3.1 The Argentina’s SIS sector: size and profile
Between 1998 and 2000, a recessive period in the Argentine economy, the turnover of the
SIS sector grew by 40 per cent, and employment levels increased by 43 per cent. This
performance is due both to the growing local demand of SIS as well as to the so-called
‘Y2K’ effect.2
Table 1
The SIS sector in Argentina, 2000 (US$ million and %)
Surveyed firms Sectoral turnover
Activity (US$ million) Relative share (%)
Software products 323.2 973 49
 Local  products 109.9 346 17
 Foreign  products 199.3 627 32
Information services 323.4 1,017 51
Total sales 632.6 1,990 100
Employment 6,400 15,000 –
Exports 14.4 35 –
                                                
2 Although no precise data exist on this issue, available information suggests that the sales of the SIS
sector fell significantly during 2001 in the context of a deepening of the economic recession that
began in 1998.6
Table 2
The SIS sector—an international comparison
(latest available year; US$ million) 3
Turnover Exports Exports/turnover ratio Employment No. of firms
India 5,700 4,000 70% 410,000 1,250
Ireland 6,245 5,907 94% 18,300 679
Israel 1,500 700 47% 20,000 300
Brazil 8,038 40 <1% na 2,500
Uruguay 180 60 33% 2,500-3,000 150
Argentina 1,340 35 <3% 15,000 500
Costa Rica na 50 na 3,500-4,000 150
Chile 125 15 12% na na
Singapore 1,660 476 29% na na
China 3,000 na na 100,000 2,000
Korea 6,000 96 <2% na na
Sources: Weber et al. (2000) and Bastos Tigre and Junqueira Botelho (1999) for Brazil, Nasscom for
India, Tallon and Kraemer (1999) for Ireland, Israel Association of Software Houses for Israel,
Computerworld Chile (1999) and Baeza Yates et al. (1995) for Chile, MIEM (1999) for Uruguay,
Caprosoft for Costa Rica, Coe (1999) for Singapore, Zhang (2000) for Korea and China and our own
estimates for Argentina.
The sales of the surveyed firms amounted to US$  630 million in 2000 and their
employment reached about 6,400 people in that same year. Taking into account that there
are nearly 500 firms in the SIS sector in Argentina, and making certain assumptions about
the market structure of the sector, it is possible to estimate that the annual turnover of the
Argentine SIS sector will reach around US$ 2,000 million (0.7 per cent of the GDP) and
that the firms of the sector will employ approximately 15,000 people (Table 1).
The SIS firms employ high-skilled personnel; 45 per cent of the employees of the
surveyed firms are university graduates, while 37 per cent are technicians and university
students. Nearly 70 per cent of the employees with graduate and post-graduate degrees
come from informatics-related careers. Nonetheless, the proportion of employees with
post-graduate studies is very low (4 per cent, half of which correspond to informatics
careers).4 In this regard, it must be noted that a recent survey shows that Brazilian firms
have on average three employees with post-graduate degrees, a figure more than double
that of Argentina.
Nearly half of the sales volume of the surveyed firms consists of software products, while
the other half comes from services activities. Local products represent about 36 per cent of
the sales of software products. Hence, it can be estimated that the annual sales of local
software products reach about US$ 350 million. However, the share of imported software in
                                                
3 The estimates of this table include the provision of information services and the sales of local
software. We have tried to exclude, as far as it has been possible using the available data, the sales of
foreign software. Nonetheless, given the heterogeneity of the sources, it is possible that the definition
of the SIS sector in each country may slightly differ, a fact that may hinder the comparability of the
figures to some extent.
4 Four firms, of which three are foreign owned, employ 40 per cent of the personnel with post-graduate
degrees in the SIS sector.7
the domestic market is not very different from what was registered in the past, though the
data may no be strictly comparable. Furthermore, the market orientation of the SIS firms
has not changed in a significant way.
The Argentine SIS sector is still strongly inward-oriented and exports by a small
number of firms5 are negligible in terms of the sector’s turnover. Just 20 of the almost
100 surveyed firms were involved in exports in 2000, and only six had exports/sales
ratios above 10 per cent. Exports totalled more than US$ 1 million in only three firms.
This weak export performance is due both to microeconomic factors (the type of
products and services offered by the local firms, their weaknesses in terms of quality and
marketing capabilities, etc.) as well as to other elements related to the environment in which
they operate (high labour costs, lack of access to finance, the absence of public policies
supporting the exports of SIS, etc.). More on these issues below.
How does the Argentinean SIS sector compare with those of other latecomer countries?
Table 2 clearly shows that Argentina is well behind countries such as India, Israel,
Ireland and Singapore not only in terms of the sector’s turnover but also in terms of the
weak export performance. The same can be said in a comparison of a neighbour and
much smaller country—Uruguay.
In comparison, even if exports are also very low in other countries such as Brazil and
Korea, their domestic sales are much higher than in Argentina, a fact that may
compensate for the absence of exports to a certain extent.
3.2 Age, size, nationality and recent performance of SIS firms
Most Argentine SIS firms are young: the surveyed firms were, on average, 11 years old.
Sixty-five per cent of the surveyed firms were established after 1990, with a few firms
created before the 1980s (and most of these are firms whose main activity is the
provision of hardware and telecommunications equipment that also sell information
services). In spite of being a minority within the sector, firms established before 1990
accounted for more than two-thirds of SIS sales in 2000. Furthermore, while their sales
grew by 57 per cent between 1998 and 2000, the sales of firms created after 1990
increased by 48 per cent in the same period.
Locally-owned small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) are clearly prevalent in this
sector; 80 per cent of the firms that answered our survey were SMEs and 85 per cent
were locally owned.
However, foreign firms account for two-thirds, and firms with more than 50 employees
account for 86 per cent of the turnover of the SIS sector (Table 3). In turn, only 9 per
cent of the surveyed firms had annual sales above US$ 15 million, while 46 per cent of
the firms sold less than US$ 1 million a year, and 22 per cent of the firms had sales
valued between US$ 1 and 2 million (Table 4).
                                                
5 Two-thirds of the exports of the surveyed firms were made by the local affiliate of a German
transnational corporation.8
Hence, the structure of the sector is very heterogeneous, with a small group of big and
mostly foreign owned firms having the lion’s share of the local market, and many domestic
SMEs with very low levels of sales and employment.
Firms whose main activity is the provision of information services account for nearly
half of the sector’s turnover and employment levels (Table 3). A small group of firms
that sell foreign packaged software products contributes 37 per cent of the sector’s
turnover. Finally, several local software developers account for 18 per cent of the
turnover and 33 per cent of the employment within the sector.
The recent performance of the different groups of firms has been heterogeneous. The
firms whose sales increased the most were those dedicated to the provision of
information services as well as those that sold foreign software products. In turn, the
biggest firms grew more than the SMEs, and foreign firms more than local firms
(Figures 1, 2 and 3).
Table 3
Sales, employment and exports of the surveyed firms, 2000
(US$ million, number of employees and %)
Sales Employment Exports
By origin of capital US$ million Share, %
No. of
employees Share, % US$ million Share, %
Foreign firms 415.1 66 2,702 42 10.5 73
Local firms 217.4 34 3,697 58 3.9 27
Total 632.6 100 6,399 100 14.4 100
By size
Large (1 544.2 86 4,598 72 10.1 70
Medium (2 74.5 12 1,340 21 3.9 27
Small (3 13.9 2 461 7 0.4 3
Total 632.6 100 6,399 100 14.4 100
By main activity
Local products (4 112.3 18 2,082 33 10.8 75
Foreign products (5 231.9 37 1,164 18 0 0
Information services (6 288.3 46 3,153 49 3.6 25
Total 632.6 100 6,399 100 14.4 100
Notes: (1 50 employees or more.
(2 Between 10 and 50 employees.
(3 10 employees or less.
(4 Local and foreign firms whose main activity in the SIS sector is the development of software
products in Argentina.
(5 Local and foreign firms whose main activity in the SIS sector is the commercialization of
foreign software products in Argentina.
(6 Local and foreign firms whose main activity in the SIS sector is the provision of information
services (customized software, implementation of software packages, consultancy, etc.).9
Table 4
Turnover levels of the SIS firms in Argentina (%)
Share, %
Less than US$ 1 million a year 46
Between US$ 1 and 2 million a year 22
Between US$ 2 and 5 million a year 13
Between US$ 5 and 15 million a year 10
More than US$ 15 million a year 9
3.3 Customer’s profile
As shown in Table 5, the main customers of the Argentine SIS sector are large firms,
accounting for two-thirds of the sectoral turnover.
In the case of big and medium-sized SIS firms,6 large firms, jointly with the
government sector, comprise more than 80 per cent of their sales. These customers
acquire mostly foreign software products and information services, that are mostly
related to the implementation and customization of complex software packages.
While home users are not relevant as customers for the SIS sector,7 the government
buys almost exclusively from big and medium-sized firms. Many SMEs have reported
that they experience many difficulties in becoming suppliers of the government.
Frequently that they cannot even enter tenders for the provision of SIS to the public
sector, given the fact that bids are usually open only to ‘short-listed’ companies
composed exclusively of foreign firms.
Table 5
Turnover structure by type of user (%)
Type of SIS firms







services Big Medium-sized Small
Home users 1 0 6 0 1 0 10
SMEs 16 29 37 3 15 17 55
Large firms 66 55 50 77 66 74 32
Government 16 16 7 19 18 7 2
Others 1 0 1 1 0 2 0
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
                                                
6 Medium-sized firms were defined as those having between 10 and 50 employees. Firms with less than
10 employees were defined as small, while big or large SIS firms were those with more than 50
employees.
7 The low share of home users in the sales of the SIS sector is mainly due to the high piracy levels that
exist in that segment of customers. In addition, home customers buy mostly, if not exclusively, foreign
software products.10
In contrast, the main customers of the small SIS firms are SMEs, which account for 50
per cent of the sales for that group of firms. Hence, given the fact that SMEs in
Argentina have been deeply affected by the recession beginning in 1998, it is not
surprising to find that the performance of small SIS firms has been worse than that of
medium and big firms between 1998 and 2000. It must also be taken into account that
the share of SMEs customers is higher for those firms that sell packaged products —
both local as well as foreign—than for those that are specialized in professional services
(which are mainly oriented towards large customers).
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3.4 Programming tools and platforms
Visual Basic is the most common programming language (nearly two-thirds of the
surveyed firms use it). HTML and Java, which are mostly oriented towards Internet
applications, are also widely used (58 and 48 per cent of the surveyed firms used these
languages, respectively). Regarding object-oriented languages, as mentioned before,
Java is widely known, while this is not the case with Smalltalk (only 11 per cent of the
surveyed firms use this language). C++, which is partially an object-oriented language
also, is used by 38 per cent of the firms. The largest SIS firms utilize the most advanced
languages. While 21 per cent of the big firms employ Smalltalk for programming, none
of the small firm use it. In comparison, Java is utilized by 68 per cent of the big firms
and by 29 per cent of the small ones. Usage percentages for C++ are 53 per cent for the
big firms versus 21 per cent for the small ones.
Almost all firms develop software products for personal computers, and many of them
offer only software products for PCs. In turn, the different versions of Windows
(NT/98/95/2000) are clearly dominant. In fact, 88 per cent of the firms develop products
for Windows NT, a fact that is consistent with the finding that most SIS firms are
oriented towards business customers (see below). Expectedly, large and medium sized
firms are the main providers of SIS mainframes, AS/400 and workstations. There are
few firms oriented towards less conventional platforms (such as industrial equipment
and consumer devices).
Nearly half of the surveyed firms develop software products for UNIX-type operative
systems, Linux, Solaris and HP-UX being the most popular. While large and medium
sized firms are clearly dominant in the case of Solaris and HP-UX, it is important to
highlight the fact that 25 per cent of the firms developing products for Linux are small.12
3.5 Quality standards and marketing capabilities
Large firms tend to adopt better quality standards than SMEs. Between 55 and 60 per
cent of the large firms under review make strategic plans that are periodically updated,
agree on quality goals and measure quality indicators in a systematic way. In contrast,
the proportion of SMEs that undertake those practices regularly varies between 20 and
30 per cent.
Only 16 per cent of the surveyed firms have a quality certification, which is very low in
comparison with other developing countries (for instance, a survey made in Brazil in
1999 showed that 26 per cent of the Brazilian firms had a quality certification).8
Expectedly, 40 per cent of the large firms had a quality certification versus only 9 per
cent on the part of the SMEs. In turn, 21 per cent of the local developers had a
certification, which in the case of information services providers was only 9 per cent.
With regard to marketing, most firms employ two or more channels, but the preferred
channel is direct contact with customers. Consultancy activities are also a way to
establish new contracts. In comparison, subcontracting is almost non-existent. The key
role played by direct contact with customers is consistent with the fact that local SIS
firms are highly inward oriented. Nonetheless, it must be noted that some firms have
opened commercial offices abroad, trying to replicate the network of contacts they have
developed locally.
3.6 Competitive advantages and disadvantages
Customers of the local software developers are mostly active in sectors such as banking,
retail and wholesale trade, health care and telecommunications, as well as in public
administration. In any case, the firms that develop local software are mainly
concentrated in making products for such fields as accountancy and enterprise
management solutions. These products are mostly oriented towards the domestic SMEs
that cannot afford to buy expensive software packages provided by the large
international software firms (such as SAP, People Soft, etc.). In addition, there are
highly ‘idiosyncratic’ features of the local legislation governing accountancy rules,
fiscal and labour regulations, etc., that give some advantage to domestic software
providers because even though the software packages offered by large international
providers can obviously be adapted to meet local requirements, ‘customization’ costs
are far beyond the available budget of most domestic SMEs.
In turn, this advantage of the local software developers may become a constraint in
selling their products abroad. The same factors that prevent local customers from using
foreign software packages also act as barriers for Argentine software developers in
attempts to penetrate third markets. Furthermore, in these markets Argentinean firms
lack information on the ‘business culture’ and the personal contacts which are the key
factors of their survival in the domestic market, but which become handicaps abroad.
In fact, when questioned about their main strengths and weaknesses, local firms mostly
answered that their main strength was in their capacity to adapt to the specific
                                                
8 Weber et al. (2000).13
requirements of their customers. In turn, their weaknesses seem to consist mostly of the
lack of scale of their production and the inadequacy of their marketing channels.
Local SIS firms are highly diversified in terms of the activities they develop and the
kind of services/products they offer. While this may reflect, on one hand, great
flexibility for adapting to different demands, it may on the other hand be the result of
the impossibility of surviving through specialization strategies in a relatively small local
market. Especially, the latter may be the case for the small SIS firms that are forced to
face diversified demands if they wish to stay in the market. Nonetheless, this can
become an obstacle to the future development of the sector, since these firms are losing
potential gains which could be derived from business strategies that focus on developing
‘core’ specialization areas.
Furthermore, the sort of ‘natural protection’ that the local SIS firms used to enjoy from
the ‘idiosyncrasies’ of the local market is gradually eroding due to:
−   The large international software providers are increasingly entering the ‘top’ of the
SMEs market by offering less expensive packages suited to the needs of these firms;
−   Many foreign firms (specially from Spain) are competing with prices in the SMEs
segment with packaged products;
−   Technological changes (software updates through Internet, technical support via call
centres, etc.) are eroding advantages enjoyed by local firms;
−   Several local firms have been acquired by transnational corporations (TNCs), whose
affiliates tend to prefer foreign software packages (see Stamm 2000).
Furthermore, even if the market for local SIS firms expands as a result of domestic
SMEs needing to upgrade their informatics structure, doubts remain about the effective
volume that can be achieved in the market because over the last decade SMEs have
been going through a difficult restructuring process and face severe economic and
financial problems.
Thus, in view of the above mentioned difficulties that local SIS firms face in trying to
market business software products abroad, the obvious conclusion is that the
specialization in the SIS market segment does not look very promising for Argentine
firms. At the same time, even though previous studies have noted that Argentina has
competitive advantages for developing SIS for certain market niches (entertainment,
applications for health care systems, industrial automation, public administration and
agricultural production, etc.),9 our survey does not show any indication towards the
specialization of the local SIS firms in any of these areas.
                                                
9 According to Perazzo et al. (1999) Argentina should have advantages to make inroads in these
activities due to: i) a relatively high cultural level, at least by Latin American standards; ii) domestic
markets for these activities may reach significant dimensions, especially in agricultural and health
applications, as well as in entertainment iii) information technologies are rather well diffused in the
public sector—once more, compared to Latin American standards; iv) the lack of linguistic barriers
may facilitate the penetration in other Latin American countries.14
Nonetheless, some firms work in SIS for telecommunications, and some investments by
TNCs have been announced in this area. If these investments materialize, a cluster of
sorts could emerge in this area.
Finally, even thought we have been reviewing local software ‘developers’, it needs to be
noted that local firms rarely make true ‘innovations’. Instead, they are mostly dedicated
to improving and adapting their products to new technologies and platforms or to
widening the range of applications of their products, though there has been at least one
case where a local firm built their market success on its innovation capability.
In this regard, notice must be taken of the fact that local firms have very few linkages
with R&D institutions, universities, consultancy firms, etc. Furthermore, the relatively
small size of the domestic market poses an obstacle for undertaking innovative
activities, since the costs should be difficult to recover. Last but not least, local demand,
especially that of SMEs, does not seemingly induce SIS firms to significantly upgrade
their innovative and learning capabilities.
4 The impact of the macroeconomic and institutional environment
According to the surveyed firms, the Argentine macroeconomic and institutional
environment has both positive and negative impacts on the development of the SIS
sector.
Among the positive factors, the quality of domestic human resources is clearly valued
the most by the SIS firms, especially by the large and medium-sized enterprises, as well
as by those which provide information services and by those that develop local software
products.
On the other hand, labour costs are relatively high. They are, in fact, higher than those
in some countries of the European periphery (Portugal, Greece, Ireland) and thus
impose a disadvantage to Argentina as a location for developing export-oriented SIS
activities, since these European are closer to the main markets and they belong to the
EU. However, with the massive devaluation of the peso in 2002, labour costs are now
much lower than before and should constitute a positive factor for increasing the price
competitiveness of local SIS firms.
In turn, even though it is widely acknowledged that Argentine graduates in informatics-
related careers are well trained, according to Perazzo et al. (1999) there are few
universities with a staff of full-time professors or where research is done pari passu
with teaching activities. In addition, there are very few post-graduate courses, and their
quality is assessed as mediocre. Since budget restrictions have for a long time prevented
the country from offering a wide grant programme which would enable students to
study abroad, it is no surprise that only about 30 professionals with doctoral degrees
currently work in the Argentine SIS firms. Thus, the SIS sector lacks high-skilled
professionals for high-level consultancy or research activities. In turn, university
teaching is affected not only by the lack of high-quality personnel, but also by the fact
that university wages are very low compared to the private sector. In addition, best
students are often hired by private firms before completing their graduate courses, and
many of these never graduate. Furthermore, universities do not seem to instil an15
entrepreneurial attitude among their students, a factor that may be hindering the creation
of new firms.
In any case, it is clear that the scarcity of high-level personnel is a major limitation to
developing innovative activity, and is also a factor that may negatively affect the
academic training of students. Last but not least, if the local demand for professionals in
this area continues to increase and the ‘braindrain’ of the last years is not stopped, a
shortage in the absolute supply of professional for local SIS firms is foreseeable in the
medium term.
It also needs to be mentioned that even though the telecommunications infrastructure
has substantially improved over the last decade, telecommunication costs were
considered high by local firms. With the peso devaluation, these costs are now lower but
the quality of service may be also less due to the higher costs of importing inputs,
components and equipment for telecom companies. This factor may cause further delays
in the technological modernization of the communications infrastructure.
On the other hand, the use of information technologies has grown substantially in both
the public and the private sectors. Argentina is above the average for Latin American in
terms of the diffusion of information and communication technologies, but other
countries such as Uruguay, Brazil, Chile and Mexico show comparable or even better
indicators.
Another clearly negative factor for the development of the SIS sector is access to
finance. SIS firms, and SMEs in particular, have trouble in accessing the formal
financial system. In addition, there is a lack of financing alternatives since the stock
market is weak and systems such as venture capital are almost unknown.10 Even though
some public policies aimed at facilitating access to credit by SMEs have been in effect
for many years, they do not extend to the specific circumstances of these high-tech
sectors that mainly produce intangibles and are knowledge intensive. The situation has
worsened recently because, following foreign debt default and currency devaluation, the
current problems in Argentina’s financial sector have cut off the access to formal
financial mechanisms for the time being. Thus, in this scenario, it comes as no surprise
to find that some local firms wanting to expand their operations have looked for funds
from abroad.11 At least two firms taking this step have finally sold the majority stake of
their companies to foreign owners. In any case, this may not necessarily be bad insofar
as the management remains in local hands and domestic development activities are
preserved.
Research and technological institutions are generally weak in Argentina, and this is all
the more visible in the case of the SIS sector. There are almost no R&D activities in
software either in public institutions or in universities. Furthermore, when these
activities are undertaken, they have no commercial impact. Even though the government
has put in place some initiatives aiming at fostering R&D activities in private firms
since the mid-1990s, they have had only a marginal effect on the mostly negative
scenario. In this regard, it needs to be noted that the size of the domestic market is
                                                
10 The problem of access to finance is common to all high-tech SMEs in Argentina.
11 In fact, this is not unusual for this sector, since the same has happened even with some successful
European firms.16
judged by the SIS firms to be too small for recovering the high costs faced by firms
trying to undertake truly innovative activity.
Which public policies do the SIS firms consider as the most helpful in order to foster the
development of the sector? Given the fact that firms consider the tax burden to be the
factor that causes the greatest hindrance to  their operations, it is no surprise to find that
fiscal incentive measures have been much appreciated by the firms under review.
In comparison, policies aimed at facilitating access to foreign markets have not been
perceived as relevant. This is a reflection of the fact that SIS firms do not seem to be
worried about the excessive inward-orientation of the sector. Policies geared at fostering
entrepreneurship, such as incubators, etc., have also been viewed as somewhat relevant
by the surveyed firms.
Finally, piracy levels are above the average or Latin American. This is due more to the
low level of domestic law enforcement rather than the absence of regulations governing
software piracy.12 Understandably, firms distributing foreign software products are
worried about this situation.
5 Conclusions and policy suggestions
From what has been said, it seems clear that the Argentine SIS sector is missing most of
the conditions considered by Heeks (1999) as key elements for successful entry into this
activity.
It has been suggested that some incidents, where an export-oriented strategy has been
followed, may have become confined to a low-innovation trajectory.13 The experience
of Argentina shows that strategies which are strongly focused on serving the domestic
markets by taking advantage of local circumstances (geographic and cultural proximity
with customers, the distinctive features of domestic accounting, fiscal, labour, etc.
regulations) may also lead to the same type of ‘lock-in’ or confinement. Factors, which
facilitate the survival of SIS firms in their local environment, may also prevent them
from developing the evolutionary learning process needed for a sustainable expansion
strategy for this sector.
The Argentine SIS sector is dominated by a small group of mostly foreign-owned large
firms, which mainly sell foreign software products and/or provide information services.
These services are associated with the implementation and customization of complex
software packages for large customers, including private firms and government
organizations. This group of dominant firms had a relatively better performance between
1998 and 2000 vis-à-vis other SIS firms. There are, on the other hand, several small,
young local firms that develop software products and provide different information
services. Their main clients are SMEs. As a whole, this group of firms did not perform
as well as the large SIS firms.
                                                
12 According to the Business Software Alliance, piracy rates in Argentina are around 62 per cent
compared to 36 per cent for world level and 59 per cent for the Latin American average. Piracy, however,
is declining, going from 80 per cent in 1994-95 to 62 per cent in 1998-99.
13 See D’Costa (2000) for details on the case of India.17
Domestic firms have basically focused on a particular segment of the domestic market
(software for accountancy, management, etc.) where they enjoy advantages derived
from the idiosyncratic feature of the domestic regulations and their knowledge about the
business culture and the needs of their local clients. However, for different reasons,
these advantages seem to be fading and the SIS firms—or at least the majority of
them—have not been able to redefine their market strategy and their specialization
pattern, and they survive mostly by supplying the demands that they feel they may be
able to satisfy.
The peso devaluation may have solved some of the problems Argentine SIS firms faced
in attempts to compete in the area of skilled-labour costs, but it does not solve the
systemic problems of the sector:
−   Apart from some isolated exceptions, Argentine SIS firms have never competed
through innovation;
−   There is a lack of marketing and management capabilities;
−   Networking mechanisms are weak, both among SIS firms as well as with their
customers, R&D institutions, etc.; and
−   Access to investment and working capital has always been a problem and presently
working capital exists neither from local nor international sources.
The situation is even worse with regard to public policies. The lack of access to finance
is a problem not only for SIS firms, but for most Argentine SMEs. Venture capital is
almost unknown and tax incentives are absent. R&D capabilities are very weak; there
are problems with the enforcement of intellectual property rights; the
telecommunications infrastructure is modern but expensive, and state procurement does
not favour local provision of SIS. With regard to human capital, the level of graduates
in informatics is good, but there is a shortage of high-skilled personnel. Finally, nothing
like a ‘national vision’ of the SIS sector exists in the Argentine case.
In this light, it is not surprising to find that even though the SIS sector has grown during
the last ten years, it has not been able to overcome the problems diagnosed already in
the 1980s and early 1990s: lack of access to finance, excessive inward-orientation, lack
of marketing and R&D capabilities, etc.
The fact that this sector has grown in spite of the absence of stimulating public policies
may be considered as proof of the ability of the SIS firms to survive without public
support. However, it is clear that the dynamic perspectives of this trajectory are, to say
the least, very uncertain.
As mentioned before, there is a small number of large, mostly foreign-owned firms that
have performed very well in recent years and that are geared to selling foreign software
products or to providing information services for the public sector and large domestic
customers. Compared to the SMEs of the SIS sector, these firms have a relatively better
access to human resources and finance, are advanced more in terms of quality
management systems and dominate the most modern programming tools. However, they
seldom undertake innovative activity and rarely export their products and services.18
On the other hand, there are several small and medium-sized SIS firms that lack the
size, human resource capacity and capital to engage in truly innovative processes, and
are thus forced to survive mostly through inward-oriented strategies where they utilize
the ‘localization advantages’, i.e. their knowledge and their capability of adaptation to
the local regulations, customers requirements, business culture, etc.
In this environment, the Argentine SIS sector may continue growing pari passu to meet
the local demand, but it is highly improbable that it will develop into a dynamic and
internationally competitive sector. Its development will be constrained, among others,
by the relatively small size of the domestic market, the lack of access to finance and of
marketing and R&D capabilities, the absence of networking mechanisms, the paucity of
public support (i.e., tax incentives, state procurement, etc.), the weakness of quality
management systems and the shortages in the availability of high-skilled personnel.
To revert this negative outlook, there is need for measures aimed at improving the SIS
firms capabilities and endowments, as well as public policies to support this sector, so
as to restructure the SIS sector in order to dramatically increase its export capacity.
While the peso devaluation certainly brings some relief, it is of major importance to
work on non-price competitiveness issues as soon as possible. This should be
accomplished through a gradual process, in which improvements in the firms’
competitive position will allow them to increasingly penetrate foreign markets. This, in
turn, this might result in a sort of ‘virtuous circle’, since local firms, once having gained
access to expanded markets, could attempt to cater to the requirements of foreign
customers. These can be not only different but in some cases also more demanding than
those of local customers. The state needs to help in this process through some support
measures as well as through enhancement of the local technological structure and the
system of human resources formation. The creation of a supportive environment which
would induce young entrepreneurs to engage in this sector should also be a major task
for the state. This could be done, for example, by dismantling red tape and barriers,
facilitating the access to finance etc. Lastly, pari passu there is the strengthening of the
domestic SIS firms: the possibility of attracting large international SIS firms should be
explored in order to establish their regional basis in South America, since Argentina—in
spite of all the problems mentioned above—has some major advantages which would
allow the country to achieve a dominating presence in the region.
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